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Despite  success  in  reducing  poverty  over  the  last  twenty  years,  inequality  in  Chile  has  remained 
virtually  unchanged,  making  Chile  one  of  the  least  equal  countries  in  the  world.  High  levels  of 
inequality have been shown to hamper further reductions in poverty as well as economic growth, and 
local  inequality  has  been  shown  to  affect  such  outcomes  as  violence  and  health.  The  study  of 
inequality at the local level is thus crucial for understanding the economic well-being of a country. 
Local  measures  of  inequality  have  been  difficult  to  obtain,  but  recent  theoretical  advances  have 
enabled the combination of survey and census data to generate estimates of inequality that are robust at 
disaggregated geographic levels. In this paper, we employ this methodology to produce consistent and 
precise  estimates  of  inequality  for  every  county  in  Chile.  We  find  considerable  heterogeneity  in 
county-level estimates of inequality, with Gini coefficients ranging from 0.41 to 0.63.  An appendix 
includes estimated inequality for each county so the broader research community may assess the effect 
of local inequality on a broad range out outcomes, as well as analyze the determinants of inequality 
itself. 
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1. Introduction 
  Between 1986 and 2005 per capita GDP in Chile grew by 203%. The engine underlying 
this dramatic economic performance was a series of economic reforms begun in the mid-1970s, 
many  of  which  were  deepened  during  the  1990s  (see,  for  example,  Clapp  1995).  Although 
privatization and deregulation were the hallmarks of these reforms, poverty reduction was also 
an important policy objective beginning in the early 1980s, and gains against poverty have been 
as impressive as Chile’s growth statistics. Using a standardized form
1 that evaluates housing 
characteristics to identify poor households, the government coupled housing subsidies with cash 
and in-kind transfers to the poor.
2 Housing criteria were also used to identify locations for new 
schools and health care facilities. Chile thus took a multi-pronged approach to poverty reduction 
(Beyer 1997, Valdés 1999), and poverty rates fell from approximately 39.4 % in 1987 to 18.7% 
in 2003; indigence rates also fell dramatically during this period, from approximately 14.2% to 
4.7%.  
However, inequality has remained relatively constant during this period, and the Gini 
continues to be among the highest in the world (Contreras and Larrañaga, 1999; Ferreira and 
Litchfield, 1999; Contreras, Larrañaga, and Valdés, 2001; Contreras, 2003) despite the global 
trend towards convergence evident since the 1980s. For example, the Gini coefficient was 0.547 
in 1987 and 0.546 in 2003 (Figure 1). Income inequality has been buoyed by low levels of 
migration (Soto and Torche 2004), uneven returns to education (Gindling and Robbins, 2001), 
                                                   
1The “CAS Card,” renamed the “CAS-2 Card” after revisions in 1987. 
2 Such subsidies fall into five main categories: 1. Family Subsidy (SUF): A subsidy provided to pregnant women, 
parents with children not covered by social security, and parents or guardians of persons with physical disabilities. 
To be eligible, beneficiaries must agree to take children under age 6 for regular medical checkups and to send 
children aged 6 to 18 years to school; 2. Unemployment: A monthly payment for up to one year for unemployed 
workers who lost work through no fault of their own; 3. Assistance Pensions (PASIS): Pensions are provided for 
adults aged 65 and over, physically-disabled adults, and mentally-disabled individuals regardless of age who have a 
total income below half of the minimum pension allowance; 4. Solidarity Subsidy (Chile Solidario): A subsidy that 
targets indigent families and households with female heads. 5. Water and Sewage Subsidy (SAP): A three-year, 
renewable subsidy to offset the cost of water among poor households.   2 
foreign competition in labor-intensive goods (Beyer, Rojas, and Vergara, 1999), increased labor 
market participation among women (Contreras, Puentes, and Bravo, 2005), and an increasing 
reliance on seasonal and fixed-contract labor (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2005).  
Inequality has been shown to have important effects on poverty, on social outcomes, and 
on public finance, and has thus become a growing concern for the public and policymakers alike. 
For example, for any given level of average income, greater inequality generally implies higher 
levels of poverty. Moreover, Ravallion (1997, 2004) shows that greater inequality causes poverty 
levels to fall at a lower rate. In terms of social outcomes, inequality at the local level impacts 
health,  education,  and  the  incidence  of  crime  and  violence  (Deaton  1999).  The  levels  and 
heterogeneity of local inequality may also impact tax collections and may influence the optimal 
degree of decentralization and provision of public goods (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999).  
  National policies that target poverty reduction may have an impact on inequality. For 
example, progressive taxation and appropriately-targeted cash subsidies may reduce both poverty 
and income inequality. However, poverty-reduction programs may also raise inequality; as a case 
in point, improving the quality of education has been more effective in reducing poverty than 
expanding access to education (Chumacero and Paredes 2005), yet the resulting disparities in 
access raise income inequality. Similarly, Chile’s generous housing subsidies have been effective 
at reducing poverty, yet they have also had the undesirable effect of tying individuals to their 
places of origin, thereby preventing migration to more productive areas with higher wages (Soto 
and Torche 2004).  
  Policy implementation may similarly affect inequality. On the one hand, local authorities 
have  better  information  about  local  needs;  on  the  other,  they  may  be  more  susceptible  to 
influence from vested interests and local elites (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Elite capture of   3 
funding  for  poverty  alleviation  is  difficult  to  test  because  detailed  income  data  that  are 
representative at low levels of aggregation are not available for most countries.  
  As  with  most  countries,  income  data  in  Chile  are  derived  from  household  surveys; 
although  surveys  such  as  the  National  Survey  of  Socioeconomic  Characterization  (Casen) 
contain detailed information on income and a wealth of other information for a large number of 
households,  they  are  not  representative  at  the  sub-regional  level.  As  a  result,  poverty  and 
inequality in Chile have primarily been studied at the national and regional level (e.g., Contreras 
1996;  Contreras  and  Ruiz-Tagle  1997;  Feres  2000; Contreras  2001;  Pizzolito  2005a,  2005b) 
rather  than  at  the  sub-regional  level  of  provinces  or  counties.  Census  data,  by  contrast,  is 
representative at every level of aggregation (by definition), although they typically do not collect 
any information whatsoever about income. Censuses thus cannot not been used in the study of 
income inequality. 
  This problem has motivated research into methods for combining survey and census data 
in order to obtain geographically-disaggregated estimates of inequality. The sophistication of 
these  methods  has  advanced  a  great  deal  in  recent  years,  and  it  is  now  possible  to  obtain 
estimates that are statistically precise and reliable (e.g., Hentschel, et al.1999).
3  In this paper, we 
adapt the methodology formalized by Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) to obtain estimates 
of  inequality  at  the  county-level  in  Chile.  We  find  considerable  heterogeneity  in  inequality 
among Chile’s 341 counties and suggest that geographic considerations may be appropriate for 
policymakers  who  wish  to  address  inequality.  An  appendix  provides  the  estimated  Gini 
coefficients and standard errors so that the broader research community may explore the impact 
                                                   
3 This methodology has since been use to estimate wellbeing at the local level in Ecuador and Madagascar 
(Demombynes, et al. 2002), South Africa (Demombynes and Özler 2005), Mozambique (Elbers, et al. 2003), India 
(Kijima and Lanjouw 2003), and Cambodia (Elbers, et al. 2007).   4 
of precisely-estimated measures of inequality on a spectrum of socioeconomic outcomes, as well 
as the determinants of inequality itself. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the methodology 
being used, both conceptually and in detail; section 3 provides a detailed description of the data; 
section 4 presents the results with detailed maps describing inequality at the county level; and 
section 5 offers a brief conclusion and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Methodology 
  The intuition behind the methodology proposed by Hentschel, et al.(1999) and developed 
by Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) is conceptually straightforward: a model of income or 
consumption is first estimated using survey data, restricting the explanatory variables to those 
also  available  in both  the  survey  and  a census  undertaken  at  a  similar  point  in  time. These 
parameters are then used to estimate income or consumption for the entire population based on 
the census data. Finally, poverty and inequality indicators are estimated for geographic areas for 
which the census is representative but for which the survey is not. 
  Statistically, the methodology consists of estimating the joint distribution of the income 
or consumption and a vector of explanatory variables. Restricting the set of explanatory variables 
to those available in the census, the estimated  joint distribution can be used to generate the 
distribution  of  the  variable  of  interest  for  any  subgroup  of  the  population  in  the  census, 
conditional to the observed characteristics of that subgroup. This also allows for the generation 
of a conditional distribution, point estimates, and prediction errors of the associated indicators 
such as poverty and inequality.   5 
  In a first stage, a model is created that relates the income per capita of household h (Yh) in 
cluster c with a group of observable characteristics (Xh): 
 
hc hc hc hc hc hc u X u X Y E Y + = + = ] | [ln ln  
 
where the error vector u is distributed ￿(0,￿). To allow correlation within each cluster, the error 
term is further assumed to consist of a cluster component (￿) and an idiosyncratic error (￿): 
 
hc c hc u e h + =  
 
The two components are assumed to be independent of each other and uncorrelated with the 
observable variables Xhc.  
  It is not necessary to specify a restrictive functional form for the idiosyncratic component 
of the error, 
2
e s . Indeed, with consistent estimators of ￿, the residuals of the decomposition of 
the estimated error, 
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can be used to estimate the variance of ￿.
4  The functional form commonly used for estimating 
the variance of the idiosyncratic error is: 
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The upper and lower limits, A and B, can be estimated together with the parameter ￿ using the 
standard  pseudo-maximum  likelihood;  the  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it  eliminates 
negative and excessively high values for the predicted variances. 
  The  simplest  means  of  estimating  the  model  is  to  use  a  linear  approximation  of  the 
conditional expectation, allowing geographic effects and heteroskedasticity into the distribution 
of  the  error  term.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  cluster  component  of  the  residual  can 
significantly reduce the power of the estimates in the second stage, and that it is thus important to 
explain the variation in income or consumption due to location via observable variables to the 
greatest extent possible.  
  The  result  of  this  first-stage  estimation  is  a  vector  of  coefficients,  ￿,  a  variance-
covariance  matrix  associated  with  this  vector,  and  a  set  of  parameters  that  describe  the 
distribution  of  the  errors.  The  second  stage  utilizes  this  set  of  parameters  along  with  the 
characteristics  of  the  individuals  or  households  in  the  census  in  order  to  generate  predicted 
values of the log of income and the relevant errors. For these effects, a bootstrap method is used 
to simulate values of income of each household or each individual. These simulated values are 
based on the prediction of the income and the error terms, ￿ and ￿: 
 
) ˆ ˆ ˆ exp( ˆ
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   7 
  For each household, the two components of the error term are taken from the empirical 
distribution described by the parameters estimated in the first stage. The coefficientsb ˆ , are taken 
from the normal multivariate distribution described by the estimators of ￿ in the first stage and 
the associated variance-covariance matrix. The complete set of simulated values of  hc Y ˆ  is then 
used to calculate the expected value of poverty or inequality measures by area. This procedure is 
repeated n times, taking a new set of coefficients ￿ and errors for each simulation; the mean and 
the standard deviations of the ￿s constitute the point estimates and the standard deviations for the 
wellbeing indicator, respectively. 
  We will call the inequality indicator G(nc, Xc, ￿, uc), where nc is a Nc vector of the number 
of household members in county c, Xc is a Ncxk vector of their observable characteristics, and uc 
is a Nc error vector. Thus, the expected value of the inequality indicator is estimated given the 
characteristics of the individuals and the households and the model estimated in the first stage, 
i.e.: 
 
[ ] x ; , | X n G E G
E
c =  
 
where  x  is the vector of parameters of the model, including the parameters that describe the 
distribution of the error term. Replacing the unknown vectorx , with a consistent estimatorx ˆ, we 
get: 
 
[ ] x ˆ , , | X n G E G
E
c =  
   8 
This  conditional  expected  value  is  generally  impossible  to  resolve  analytically,  making  it 





One complication associated with this methodology is calculating the correct standard 
errors, which is not trivial. Because it is not possible to calculate them analytically, we again 
resort to bootstrapping techniques and Monte Carlo simulations. Suppressing the subscripts, the 




, and the actual level of the 
inequality indicator for the geographic area can be decomposed into: 
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The prediction error thus has three components: the first is due to the presence of a stochastic 
error in the first stage model, implying that the actual household incomes deviate from their 
expected values (idiosyncratic error); the second is due to the variance in the estimators of the 
parameters of the model from the first stage (model error); and the third is due to the use of an 
inexact method to calculate  c G ˆ (calculation error). 
  The variance of the estimator due to the idiosyncratic error shrinks proportionally with 
the population in each geographic area. Thus, smaller populations within each geographic area 
are associated with larger idiosyncratic errors, introducing a limit to the extent of disaggregation 
that may be achieved. The variance of the estimator due to the model error can be calculated 
using the delta method: 
 
Ñ Ñ = ) ˆ (x V V
T
Model    9 
 
where [ ] x ¶ ¶ = Ñ /
E G ,  ( ) x V is the variance-covariance matrix of the first stage estimators, and 
x ˆis  a  consistent  estimator  of  x ,  also  obtained  from  the  first  stage.  This  component  of  the 
predicted errors is determined by the properties of the first-stage estimators and therefore doesn’t 
systematically change with the population in each geographic area; its magnitude depends only 
on the precision of the first-stage estimates. The variance of the estimator due to computational 
error  depends  on  the  computational  methodology  used.  Since  Monte  Carlo  simulations  are 
employed  here,  it  is  possible  to  reduce  this  error  component  by  increasing  the  number  of 
simulations;  we  use  250  simulations  to  minimize  the  error  component  to the  greatest  extent 
possible. 
  The expected value of the inequality indicator coefficient is thus conditional on the first 
stage regression, the variance due to the idiosyncratic component of income per capita of the 
households, and the gradient vector. The Monte Carlo simulation generates 250 vectors of error 
terms from the distribution estimated in the first stage. With each set of vectors, the inequality 
indicator is calculated. Then, the expected value simulated for the inequality indicator is the 
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  Finally, it is important to underscore the crucial assumption that the models estimated 
using survey data are applicable to the observations of the census. This assumption is reasonable 
enough if the year of the census and the survey coincide or are close. In the case of this particular 
study, the 2002 census is matched with the 2003 Casen survey, making the assumption implicit 
in the methodology reasonable. 
 
3. Data 
  The  survey  employed  in  the  first  stage  of  the  methodology  described  above  is  the 
November 2003 National Survey of Socioeconomic Characterization (Casen). The data collected 
include  demographic  characteristics  for  the  household  members,  distinct  sources  of  income 
including  state  transfers,  living  conditions,  ownership  of  certain  durable  goods,  access  to 
sanitation,  and  health  and  education  characteristics.  The  Casen  survey  is  undertaken  by  the 
Ministry of Planning (Mideplan), but the data are adjusted by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) using a system of national accounts as a reference. 
These  adjustments  consider  the  problems  generated  by  the  lack  of  income  data  for  some 
households and the under or over representation of some income categories in the sample.
5   
The survey utilizes a multistage method of random sampling with stratification. In the 
first stage, the country was divided between rural and urban areas for each of the 13 regions, and 
the primary sampling units are selected with probabilities proportional to the population. In the 
second stage, households are selected into the sample with equal probability. The final sample 
includes 68,153 households comprising 257,077 people. These households represent 315 of the 
                                                   
5 Although the ECLAC adjustments could generate some bias, Contreras and Larrañaga 1999 present evidence to the 
contrary. Regardless, the unadjusted data are not available.   11 
342 counties in Chile, with as few as 49 and as many as 315 households surveyed in each county. 
While coverage of counties in northern and central Chile is nearly complete, the survey poorly 
represents  counties  in  southern  Chile.  Although  Mideplan  considers  the  Casen  to  be 
representative at the regional level and for 301 self-reporting counties, there is no consensus with 
respect to the validity of the county  representativeness, and various researchers consider the 
representativeness to be only national and regional (e.g., Valdés 1999; Contreras, et al. 2001; 
Pizzolito 2005a, 2005b). 
Using  the  Casen  alone  to  calculate  inequality  yields  results  that  allow  for  very  few 
conclusions given the magnitude of the errors, a problem that persists at the regional level as 
well as the county level. For example, the Gini coefficient estimated by the Casen for the Region 
I is 0.495, but with a standard error of 0.053, the 95% confidence interval ranges from 0.392 to 
0.599. The evidence presented in the results section below as well as those obtained from similar 
studies in other countries show that the standard errors obtained by imputing income to census 
data are much lower than those obtained using survey data (Elbers et al., 2003).  
The National Institute of Statistics conducts a population and housing census every ten 
years, the most recent (and that used in this analysis) being undertaken in April 2002. The census 
covered  4,112,838  households  composed  of  15,545,921  individuals.  The  data  include 
demographic characteristics, labor status, educational level, ownership of certain assets, access to 
basic sanitation, and migration activities during the previous ten years, but neither income nor 
consumption.  
To impute income data into the census, a set of explanatory variables common to both the 
Casen  and  the  census  must  be  identified.  Although  some  explanatory  variables  are  defined 
identically in both data sets, others were constructed, the means and variances of both types of   12 
variables were evaluated to ensure that the explanatory variables from the census are indeed the 
same as those in the Casen. Using step-wise regression to detect the best fit for each region, we 
determined that household demographics, characteristics of the household head, characteristics 
of the house itself, and assets were the strongest predictors of household income. The model 
estimated in the first stage may thus be written:  
 
hc hc u A V H D Y + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ln b b b b b  
 
where the dependent variable Yhc is total per capita income of the household. D is a vector of the 
demographic  characteristics,  including  the  number  of  household  members  and  the  fraction 
household membership that is below school-age. H is a vector of characteristics of the head of 
household that includes gender, education level, and ethnicity. V is a vector of characteristics of 
the house itself, including the number of rooms, the principal construction material of the house, 
the type of flooring, the primary water source, and the distribution system of water. A is a vector 
of dummy variables that describes the ownership of various assets, including a washing machine, 
hot water heater, land line telephone, cellular phone, satellite or cable television, microwave, 
computer, and Internet access. Additionally, location dummy variables are included to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. 
  It is important to note that the objective of this first-stage regression is not to determine 
causality,  but  rather  to  make  the  best  possible  prediction  of  per  capita  income  based  on 
observable characteristics of each household. Given that the observable predictors vary across 
Chile’s  13  regions,  separate  regressions  are  estimated  for  each.  In  each,  county  dummies 
variables were also included to capture the local geographic effects.   13 
 
4. Results 
  From the coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix estimated in the first stage, the 
methodology described above is used to estimate the Gini coefficient of each county within each 
region  together  with  its  respective  standard  error.
6    Gini  coefficients  range  from  0.409  in 
Pumanque county (Region VI) to 0.627 in San Fabián county (Region VIII). 
Figure  2  shows  the  distribution  of  inequality,  measured  by  the  Gini  coefficient,  in 
northern Chile, Regions I (Tarapacá), II (Antofogasta), III (Atacama), and IV (Coquimbo). The 
counties with the highest estimated inequality in northern Chile are La Serena in Region IV and 
Iquique in Region I, with estimated Gini coefficients of 0.502 (standard error of 0.008) and 0.487 
(standard error of 0.007), respectively. Conversely, the counties with the lowest inequality are La 
Higuera and Andacollo, both in Region IV, with Gini coefficients of 0.424 (standard error of 
0.010) and 0.442 (standard error of 0.007). 
  Figure 3 depicts estimated inequality in Regions VI (O’Higgins), VII (Maule), VII (Bío-
Bío), and IX (Araucanía). As noted above, the extremes values for estimated inequality are found 
in central Chile. The counties with the highest levels of inequality are San Fabián and San Pedro 
de la Paz, both in Region VIII, with Gini coefficients of 0.607 (standard error of 0.040) and 
0.541  (standard  error  of  0.005),  respectively.  The  counties  with  the  lowest  estimated  Gini 
coefficients are Pumanque and Paredones, both in Region VI, with Gini coefficients of 0.410 
(standard error of 0.010) and 0.413 (standard error of 0.008). 
                                                   
6 Although the methodology is identical for any common indicator of inequality, we choose to focus on the Gini 
coefficient is used for two reasons. First, the Gini coefficient is widely used measure and generally well understood. 
Second, experiments and surveys that measure aversion to inequality empirically have shown that a function of 
wellbeing based on the Gini coefficient presents a much better description of the data than measures based on the 
absolute or relative aversion to inequality (Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn 1999).   14 
Figure  4  depicts  inequality  in  southern  Chile,  including  Regions  X  (Los  Lagos),  XI 
(Aisén), and XII (Magallanes). Here, Río Verde and Primavera in Region XII display the highest 
levels of income inequality, with estimated Gini coefficients of 0.541 (standard error of 0.040) 
and 0.534 (standard error of 0.020), respectively. The counties with the lowest inequality are San 
Juan de la Costa and Puqueldón, both in Region X, with Gini coefficients of 0.433 (standard 
error of 0.007) and 0.446 (standard error of 0.010).  
Finally, Figure 5 shows the distribution of inequality for Regions V (Valparaíso) and XIII 
(the Santiago Metropolitan Region). Here, the districts with the greatest inequality are Calera de 
Tango and Colina with Gini coefficients of 0.54 and 0.53, respectively, both in Region XIII. The 
districts with the least inequality are Juan Fernández in Region V and Vitacura in Region XIII, 
both of which have estimated Gini coefficients of 0.43. The relative homogeneity of income 
within these two wealthy counties is noteworthy, as is the equality of incomes across Region V, 
wherein estimated Gini coefficients range from 0.43 to 0.47. 
  These inequality maps show that heterogeneity in county-level inequality is high. Figure 
6 underscores this observation by showing the distribution of Gini coefficients for each county in 
Chile with its respective confidence intervals. Also included in the graph is a line representing 
the national Gini coefficient according to the Casen survey. Comparing the distribution of the 
county Gini coefficients to the national Gini coefficient shows that all but two counties have 
levels of inequality below the national level. This shows that although the inequality between 
counties is very important, there also exists a considerable  amount of  variation between the 
households within each county. This result is not at all surprising – the evidence from Ecuador, 
Madagascar and Mozambique is similar (Demombynes, et al. 2002) – and simply reflects that 
local communities are more homogeneous than Chile as a whole.     15 
Perhaps  the  best  way  to  represent  the  variability  of  inequality  is  to  estimate  its 
distribution. Figure 7 thus shows a histogram of the Gini coefficients together with a Kernel 
estimation for the distribution. As the figure shows, the estimated empirical distribution is not 
symmetrical and there is a greater proportion of counties with relatively more inequality, with 
respect to the average, than counties with less inequality.
7  In the future, it would be interesting 
to repeat the exercise using the 1992 census and the 1992 Casen survey. This would allow a 
comparison of two inequality distributions with ten years of difference to better understand the 
evolution of inequality at the local level. 
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
The principal objective of this work was to produce disaggregated estimates of inequality 
for Chile. This was achieved by applying the methodology developed by Hentschel, et al.(1999) 
and Elbers, et al. (2003) to the Chilean context using the 2002 population census and the 2003 
Casen survey. We find that income inequality at the county level is much lower than national 
estimates of income inequality, although there is considerable heterogeneity in inequality among 
counties. This suggests  that between-county inequality is driving Chile’s high  and persistent 
income inequality. 
The estimates developed in this paper make it possible to extend the analysis of income 
distribution at the regional level exemplified by Contreras (1996) and Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle 
(1997) to sub-regional units. Another application for which the estimates have obvious use is to 
develop better targeting for policies aimed at reducing poverty and inequality; such interventions 
may prove more effective than existing efforts in reducing Chile’s high income inequality. In 
addition, the estimates may be used to analyze the effect of poverty on a wide spectrum of social 
                                                   
7 For this reason, nonparametric estimation was used when implementing the estimation methodology.   16 
outcomes for which local measures of inequality are more likely to have an impact than national 
measures  of  inequality,  e.g.,  health  and  crime  (Deaton  1999).  Finally,  the  estimates  enable 
further  research  into  the  effects  of  local  income  inequality  on  public  finance,  including  the 
diversion of funds for poverty reduction to local elites (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005).   17 
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 Appendix 
This appendix prsents the estimated Gini coefficients and standard errors for each of Chile’s 341 
counties. All estimates are based on the methodology proposed by Elbers, et al. (2003). 
Reg.  County 
Census 
Code 
Gini     
Coef. 
Std.     
Error    Reg.  County 
Census 
Code 
Gini     
Coef. 
Std.     
Error 
                     
I  Iquique  1101  0.4809  0.00580    VIII  San Rosendo  8310  0.4673  0.01260 
I  Camiña  1102  0.4796  0.01813    VIII  Santa Bárbara  8311  0.4849  0.00656 
I  Colchane  1103  0.4947  0.02219    VIII  Tucapel  8312  0.4832  0.01053 
I  Huara  1104  0.4874  0.01354    VIII  Yumbel  8313  0.4701  0.00586 
I  Pica  1105  0.4880  0.01209    VIII  Chillán  8401  0.5130  0.00392 
I  Pozo Almonte  1106  0.4806  0.00938    VIII  Bulnes  8402  0.4897  0.00961 
I  Arica  1201  0.4829  0.00604    VIII  Cobquecura  8403  0.4681  0.01006 
I  Camarones  1202  0.4857  0.01824    VIII  Coelemu  8404  0.4749  0.00714 
I  Putre  1301  0.4735  0.01587    VIII  Coihueco  8405  0.4659  0.00559 
I  General Lagos  1302  0.4828  0.02196    VIII  Chillán Viejo  8406  0.4888  0.00701 
II  Antofagasta  2101  0.4689  0.00712    VIII  El Carmen  8407  0.4543  0.00617 
II  Mejillones  2102  0.4503  0.00928    VIII  Ninhue  8408  0.4596  0.01349 
II  Sierra Gorda  2103  0.4720  0.02039    VIII  Ñiquén  8409  0.4519  0.00688 
II  Taltal  2104  0.4584  0.00873    VIII  Pemuco  8410  0.4526  0.00805 
II  Calama  2201  0.4683  0.00732    VIII  Pinto  8411  0.4692  0.00771 
II  Ollague  2202  0.4659  0.04078    VIII  Portezuelo  8412  0.4775  0.01365 
II  San Pedro de Atacama  2203  0.4759  0.01081    VIII  Quillón  8413  0.4673  0.00651 
II  Tocopilla  2301  0.4737  0.01037    VIII  Quirihue  8414  0.4780  0.00727 
II  María Elena  2302  0.4572  0.01586    VIII  Ránquil  8415  0.4614  0.01068 
III  Copiapo  3101  0.4791  0.00696    VIII  San Carlos  8416  0.5044  0.00969 
III  Caldera  3102  0.4670  0.00904    VIII  San Fabián  8417  0.6360  0.08344 
III  Tierra Amarilla  3103  0.4695  0.01634    VIII  San Ignacio  8418  0.4542  0.00688 
III  Chañaral  3201  0.4709  0.00983    VIII  San Nicolás  8419  0.4567  0.00797 
III  Diego de Almagro  3202  0.4846  0.00849    VIII  Treguaco  8420  0.4409  0.00978 
III  Vallenar  3301  0.4833  0.00698    VIII  Yungay  8421  0.4903  0.00659 
III  Alto del Carmen  3302  0.4647  0.01079    IX  Temuco  9101  0.5321  0.00651 
III  Freirina  3303  0.4607  0.01044    IX  Carahue  9102  0.4773  0.00649 
III  Huasco  3304  0.4712  0.00956    IX  Cunco  9103  0.4633  0.00558 
IV  La Serena  4101  0.5024  0.00778    IX  Curarrehue  9104  0.4634  0.00934 
IV  Coquimbo  4102  0.4852  0.00666    IX  Freire  9105  0.4646  0.00690 
IV  Andacollo  4103  0.4432  0.00748    IX  Galvarino  9106  0.4679  0.00708 
IV  La Higuera  4104  0.4245  0.01021    IX  Gorbea  9107  0.4724  0.00643 
IV  Paiguano  4105  0.4570  0.01037    IX  Lautaro  9108  0.5088  0.00636 
IV  Vicuña  4106  0.4658  0.00727    IX  Loncoche  9109  0.4745  0.00557 
IV  Illapel  4201  0.4745  0.00711    IX  Melipeuco  9110  0.4671  0.01029 
IV  Canela  4202  0.4469  0.00753    IX  Nueva Imperial  9111  0.4835  0.00532 
IV  Los Vilos  4203  0.4745  0.00766    IX  Padre las Casas  9112  0.4794  0.00474 
IV  Salamanca  4204  0.4736  0.00856    IX  Perquenco  9113  0.4783  0.01302 
IV  Ovalle  4301  0.4736  0.00535    IX  Pitrufquén  9114  0.4871  0.00751 
IV  Combarbalá  4302  0.4584  0.00698    IX  Pucón  9115  0.5019  0.00649 
IV  Monte Patria  4303  0.4470  0.00670    IX  Saavedra  9116  0.4539  0.00685 
IV  Punitaqui  4304  0.4487  0.00743    IX  Teodoro Schmidt  9117  0.4617  0.01558 
IV  Río Hurtado  4305  0.4552  0.01086    IX  Toltén  9118  0.4712  0.00812 
V  Valparaíso  5101  0.4441  0.00298    IX  Vilcún  9119  0.4743  0.00596 
V  Casablanca  5102  0.4376  0.00512    IX  Villarrica  9120  0.4967  0.00594 
V  Concón  5103  0.4620  0.00481    IX  Angol  9201  0.5222  0.00639 
V  Juan Fernández  5104  0.4255  0.02248    IX  Collipulli  9202  0.4846  0.00617   20 
Reg.  County 
Census 
Code 
Gini     
Coef. 
Std.     
Error    Reg.  County 
Census 
Code 
Gini     
Coef. 
Std.     
Error 
                     
V  Puchuncaví  5105  0.4350  0.00590    IX  Curacautín  9203  0.5007  0.00700 
V  Quilpué  5106  0.4406  0.00352    IX  Ercilla  9204  0.4637  0.00833 
V  Quintero  5107  0.4468  0.00549    IX  Lonquimay  9205  0.4748  0.00794 
V  Villa Alemana  5108  0.4376  0.00349    IX  Los Sauces  9206  0.5013  0.02288 
V  Viña del Mar  5109  0.4594  0.00374    IX  Lumaco  9207  0.4767  0.00829 
V  Isla de Pascua  5201  0.4421  0.01035    IX  Purén  9208  0.4887  0.00724 
V  Los Andes  5301  0.4481  0.00387    IX  Renaico  9209  0.4685  0.00875 
V  Calle Larga  5302  0.4397  0.00778    IX  Traiguén  9210  0.5219  0.00768 
V  Rinconada  5303  0.4337  0.00795    IX  Victoria  9211  0.5168  0.00646 
V  San Esteban  5304  0.4354  0.00594    X  Puerto Montt  10101  0.5029  0.00582 
V  La Ligua  5401  0.4404  0.00476    X  Calbuco  10102  0.4650  0.00519 
V  Cabildo  5402  0.4342  0.00503    X  Cochamó  10103  0.4496  0.01001 
V  Papudo  5403  0.4333  0.00922    X  Fresia  10104  0.4615  0.00637 
V  Petorca  5404  0.4269  0.00684    X  Frutillar  10105  0.4895  0.00722 
V  Zapallar  5405  0.4297  0.00788    X  Los Muermos  10106  0.4761  0.01689 
V  Quillota  5501  0.4463  0.00365    X  Llanquihue  10107  0.4924  0.00638 
V  Calera  5502  0.4409  0.00379    X  Maullín  10108  0.4490  0.00544 
V  Hijuelas  5503  0.4269  0.00501    X  Puerto Varas  10109  0.5262  0.00879 
V  La Cruz  5504  0.4484  0.00686    X  Castro  10201  0.4973  0.00569 
V  Limache  5505  0.4440  0.00430    X  Ancud  10202  0.4824  0.00447 
V  Nogales  5506  0.4336  0.00505    X  Chonchi  10203  0.4761  0.00742 
V  Olmué  5507  0.4461  0.00553    X  Curaco de Vélez  10204  0.4524  0.01297 
V  San Antonio  5601  0.4387  0.00344    X  Dalcahue  10205  0.4542  0.00696 
V  Algarrobo  5602  0.4528  0.00720    X  Puqueldón  10206  0.4460  0.01157 
V  Cartagena  5603  0.4386  0.00546    X  Queilén  10207  0.4586  0.00965 
V  El Quisco  5604  0.4403  0.00648    X  Quellón  10208  0.4802  0.00874 
V  El Tabo  5605  0.4359  0.00693    X  Quemchi  10209  0.4643  0.00812 
V  Santo Domingo  5606  0.4700  0.00853    X  Quinchao  10210  0.4967  0.00888 
V  San Felipe  5701  0.4445  0.00352    X  Osorno  10301  0.4968  0.00390 
V  Catemu  5702  0.4332  0.00656    X  Puerto Octay  10302  0.4775  0.00787 
V  Llaillay  5703  0.4332  0.00530    X  Purranque  10303  0.4697  0.00571 
V  Panquehue  5704  0.4355  0.00901    X  Puyehue  10304  0.4548  0.00715 
V  Putaendo  5705  0.4319  0.00583    X  Río Negro  10305  0.4634  0.00650 
V  Santa María  5706  0.4304  0.00668    X  San Juan de La Costa  10306  0.4325  0.00737 
VI  Rancagua  6101  0.4504  0.00562    X  San Pablo  10307  0.4623  0.00875 
VI  Codegua  6102  0.4247  0.00753    X  Chaitén  10401  0.4919  0.00964 
VI  Coinco  6103  0.4358  0.00893    X  Futaleufú  10402  0.4676  0.01500 
VI  Coltauco  6104  0.4237  0.00646    X  Hualaihué  10403  0.4512  0.00793 
VI  Doñihue  6105  0.4304  0.00620    X  Palena  10404  0.4690  0.01447 
VI  Graneros  6106  0.4386  0.00657    X  Valdivia  10501  0.5001  0.00448 
VI  Las Cabras  6107  0.4208  0.00605    X  Corral  10502  0.4592  0.00965 
VI  Machalí  6108  0.4589  0.00668    X  Futrono  10503  0.4733  0.00670 
VI  Malloa  6109  0.4273  0.00708    X  La Unión  10504  0.4862  0.00512 
VI  Mostazal  6110  0.4330  0.00615    X  Lago Ranco  10505  0.4601  0.00769 
VI  Olivar  6111  0.4344  0.00808    X  Lanco  10506  0.4648  0.00663 
VI  Peumo  6112  0.4351  0.00735    X  Los Lagos  10507  0.4598  0.00503 
VI  Pichidegua  6113  0.4168  0.00576    X  Máfil  10508  0.4713  0.00923 
VI  Quinta de Tilcoco  6114  0.4222  0.00749    X  Mariquina  10509  0.4670  0.00629 
VI  Rengo  6115  0.4407  0.00513    X  Paillaco  10510  0.4652  0.00564 
VI  Requínoa  6116  0.4395  0.00648    X  Panguipulli  10511  0.4732  0.00494 
VI  San Vicente  6117  0.4423  0.00559    X  Río Bueno  10512  0.4859  0.01423 
VI  Pichilemu  6201  0.4347  0.00659    XI  Coihaique  11101  0.5139  0.01166 
VI  La Estrella  6202  0.4193  0.01168    XI  Lago Verde  11102  0.4831  0.02205 
VI  Litueche  6203  0.4254  0.00910    XI  Aisén  11201  0.5068  0.01366   21 
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Census 
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VI  Marchihue  6204  0.4153  0.00808    XI  Cisnes  11202  0.4994  0.01520 
VI  Navidad  6205  0.4192  0.00949    XI  Guaitecas  11203  0.4878  0.02055 
VI  Paredones  6206  0.4129  0.00807    XI  Cochrane  11301  0.5096  0.01702 
VI  San Fernando  6301  0.4501  0.00534    XI  O' Higgins  11302  0.4732  0.03027 
VI  Chépica  6302  0.4347  0.01375    XI  Tortel  11303  0.4879  0.03486 
VI  Chimbarongo  6303  0.4231  0.00519    XI  Chile Chico  11401  0.5065  0.01373 
VI  Lolol  6304  0.4252  0.00952    XI  Río Ibáñez  11402  0.4826  0.01441 
VI  Nancagua  6305  0.4243  0.00620    XII  Punta Arenas  12101  0.5217  0.00944 
VI  Palmilla  6306  0.4302  0.01873    XII  Laguna Blanca  12102  0.5317  0.03654 
VI  Peralillo  6307  0.4223  0.00729    XII  Río Verde  12103  0.5412  0.04603 
VI  Placilla  6308  0.4253  0.00859    XII  San Gregorio  12104  0.5028  0.02767 
VI  Pumanque  6309  0.4098  0.01144    XII  Cabo de Hornos  12201  0.4995  0.01777 
VI  Santa Cruz  6310  0.4440  0.00582    XII  Antártica  12202  0.4145  0.08954 
VII  Talca  7101  0.4967  0.00779    XII  Porvenir  12301  0.5238  0.01362 
VII  Constitución  7102  0.4865  0.00664    XII  Primavera  12302  0.5341  0.02869 
VII  Curepto  7103  0.4463  0.00718    XII  Timaukel  12303  0.5088  0.04143 
VII  Empedrado  7104  0.4315  0.01075    XII  Natales  12401  0.5207  0.00969 
VII  Maule  7105  0.4582  0.00745    XII  Torres del Paine  12402  0.5041  0.03358 
VII  Pelarco  7106  0.4349  0.00813    XIII  Santiago  13101  0.4696  0.00344 
VII  Pencahue  7107  0.4454  0.00783    XIII  Cerrillos  13102  0.4732  0.00327 
VII  Río Claro  7108  0.4315  0.00667    XIII  Cerro Navia  13103  0.4527  0.00280 
VII  San Clemente  7109  0.4412  0.00445    XIII  Conchalí  13104  0.4656  0.00333 
VII  San Rafael  7110  0.4416  0.00783    XIII  El Bosque  13105  0.4738  0.00574 
VII  Cauquenes  7201  0.4793  0.00543    XIII  Estación Central  13106  0.4717  0.00273 
VII  Chanco  7202  0.4533  0.00805    XIII  Huechuraba  13107  0.5114  0.00447 
VII  Pelluhue  7203  0.4505  0.00863    XIII  Independencia  13108  0.4684  0.00337 
VII  Curicó  7301  0.4937  0.00626    XIII  La Cisterna  13109  0.4729  0.00305 
VII  Hualañé  7302  0.4466  0.00722    XIII  La Florida  13110  0.4733  0.00226 
VII  Licantén  7303  0.4653  0.00932    XIII  La Granja  13111  0.4551  0.00247 
VII  Molina  7304  0.4673  0.00580    XIII  La Pintana  13112  0.4480  0.00226 
VII  Rauco  7305  0.4526  0.00849    XIII  La Reina  13113  0.4760  0.00292 
VII  Romeral  7306  0.4653  0.00800    XIII  Las Condes  13114  0.4462  0.00206 
VII  Sagrada Familia  7307  0.4465  0.00663    XIII  Lo Barnechea  13115  0.5057  0.00378 
VII  Teno  7308  0.4461  0.00586    XIII  Lo Espejo  13116  0.4535  0.00299 
VII  Vichuquén  7309  0.4465  0.01152    XIII  Lo Prado  13117  0.4637  0.00272 
VII  Linares  7401  0.4922  0.00648    XIII  Macul  13118  0.4778  0.00299 
VII  Colbún  7402  0.4440  0.00635    XIII  Maipú  13119  0.4605  0.00220 
VII  Longaví  7403  0.4339  0.00553    XIII  Ñuñoa  13120  0.4603  0.00233 
VII  Parral  7404  0.4792  0.00570    XIII  Pedro Aguirre Cerda  13121  0.4967  0.02831 
VII  Retiro  7405  0.4329  0.00572    XIII  Peñalolén  13122  0.5121  0.01056 
VII  San Javier  7406  0.4712  0.00545    XIII  Providencia  13123  0.4396  0.00231 
VII  Villa Alegre  7407  0.4639  0.00718    XIII  Pudahuel  13124  0.4595  0.00228 
VII  Yerbas Buenas  7408  0.4398  0.00648    XIII  Quilicura  13125  0.4645  0.00265 
VIII  Concepción  8101  0.5188  0.00470    XIII  Quinta Normal  13126  0.4698  0.00356 
VIII  Coronel  8102  0.4731  0.00346    XIII  Recoleta  13127  0.4738  0.00271 
VIII  Chiguayante  8103  0.5152  0.00500    XIII  Renca  13128  0.4572  0.00291 
VIII  Florida  8104  0.4594  0.00719    XIII  San Joaquín  13129  0.4676  0.00292 
VIII  Hualqui  8105  0.4683  0.00617    XIII  San Miguel  13130  0.4798  0.00336 
VIII  Lota  8106  0.4708  0.00470    XIII  San Ramón  13131  0.4576  0.00284 
VIII  Penco  8107  0.4857  0.00570    XIII  Vitacura  13132  0.4297  0.00266 
VIII  San Pedro de la Paz  8108  0.5403  0.00500    XIII  Puente Alto  13201  0.4722  0.00836 
VIII  Santa Juana  8109  0.4532  0.00627    XIII  Pirque  13202  0.5281  0.00775 
VIII  Talcahuano  8110  0.4933  0.00355    XIII  San José de Maipo  13203  0.5024  0.00611 
VIII  Tomé  8111  0.5106  0.01724    XIII  Colina  13301  0.5329  0.01910   22 
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VIII  Lebu  8201  0.4936  0.00578    XIII  Lampa  13302  0.4933  0.00546 
VIII  Arauco  8202  0.5052  0.00570    XIII  Tiltil  13303  0.4638  0.00592 
VIII  Cañete  8203  0.5092  0.00686    XIII  San Bernardo  13401  0.4821  0.00281 
VIII  Contulmo  8204  0.4825  0.01000    XIII  Buin  13402  0.4904  0.00390 
VIII  Curanilahue  8205  0.4806  0.00473    XIII  Calera de Tango  13403  0.5424  0.00709 
VIII  Los Alamos  8206  0.4663  0.00562    XIII  Paine  13404  0.4808  0.00412 
VIII  Tirúa  8207  0.5470  0.05998    XIII  Melipilla  13501  0.4830  0.00404 
VIII  Los Angeles  8301  0.5216  0.00463    XIII  Alhué  13502  0.4521  0.00918 
VIII  Antuco  8302  0.4731  0.01151    XIII  Curacaví  13503  0.4885  0.00525 
VIII  Cabrero  8303  0.4744  0.00699    XIII  María Pinto  13504  0.4573  0.00919 
VIII  Laja  8304  0.5033  0.00597    XIII  San Pedro  13505  0.4406  0.00786 
VIII  Mulchén  8305  0.4903  0.00573    XIII  Talagante  13601  0.4964  0.00429 
VIII  Nacimiento  8306  0.4841  0.00552    XIII  El Monte  13602  0.4930  0.01591 
VIII  Negrete  8307  0.4624  0.00834    XIII  Isla de Maipo  13603  0.4852  0.00551 
VIII  Quilaco  8308  0.4583  0.01042    XIII  Padre Hurtado  13604  0.4720  0.00453 
VIII  Quilleco  8309  0.4525  0.00768    XIII  Peñaflor  13605  0.5120  0.02866 
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Figure 3. Estimated Ginis in Regions VI, VII, VIII, and IX 
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Figure 5. Estimated Ginis in Regions V and XIII 
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Figure 7: Kernel distribution of Gini coefficients 
 
 
 